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III. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The date of the order appealed from in this case is November 1, 1986 The notice of 
appeal was filed on November 27, 1986 The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to U C A § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
A post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion was heard June 17, 1997 and was orally denied The 
order denying the motion has not yet been executed or filed by the trial court, and therefore is not, 
at this juncture, part of this appeal 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue # 1 Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to the Appellee 
under the standard announced in Jones v Jones. 700 P 2d 1072 (Utah 1985) and the statutory 
standards of U C A § 30-3-5(7) 
"[A] trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion " Endrodvv Endrody. 914 P 2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App 1996) (citation • 
omitted ) The issue was raised in pages 2-3 of the memorandum filed by counsel for Appellant, 
Eldon Eliason, when he objected to the Appellee's motion to amend the earlier order of the court 
which had not awarded alimony The denial of alimony was also addressed in Intervener's 
Objection to Amend the Findings on page 6, which were concurred in by the Appellant by his 
counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996, page 4, paragraph 14 
Issue # 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it assessed a judgment against the 
Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256 72, which was a payment of 
Appellee's pre-martial obligation to the I R S 9 
4 
"[T]he trial court's property division is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." 
Endrodv v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
Objections to the inclusion of an independent judgment for an I.R.S. obligation were 
specifically raised in the arguments of the Intervenors in response to the Appellee's Motion to 
Amend the Findings and Decree (part A, pages 4-5), which were concurred in by the Appellant by 
his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996, page 4, paragraph 14. 
Issue # 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered a judgment against the 
Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, when the legal conclusion does 
not comport with the Findings of Fact made by the trial court? 
If "a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such 
action would be capricious and . . . such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand." 
Malstrom v. Consolidated Theaters. 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955). 
An objection to the form and nature of the orders entered by the trial court from which an 
appeal are taken need not be raised before the trial court when such orders are prepared by the 
Appellee's counsel; in the alternative, if the pleadings are improper, and were prepared by the 
Appellee's counsel, then the inconsistent findings are to be stricken, along with the legal 
conclusion. 
V. Dispositive Legal Citations 
Dispositive legal citations in this case include the following: 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1): "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in its 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties: 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h): "Alimony may not be ordered for duration longer than the number 
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of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time " 
VI. Statement of the Case 
After living together for approximately two years in California, (Transcript, page 115, 
lines 12-15), the Plaintiff-Appellee wife and Defendant-Appellant husband were married in 
California on October 24, 1987 (Transcript page 19, line 23 ) In December of 1987, the parties 
mortgaged what had been a pre-martial home of the Plaintiff, (which home had been placed in the 
name of both parties) (Amended Decree, U 8, page 3 ) While some monies were used for points, 
adding on to the home, and for an eventual down payment on a farm in Utah, the majority of the 
funds were used to pay a premarital I R S debt of the Defendant (Id ) The Defendant had not 
participated in making house payments until he was married (Id , page 115, lines 18-23) When 
working for Hughes or Quaker Oats, Appellant gave all of his salary to the Appellee which she 
administered as she thought best, (Id , page 116, line 7 - page 117, line 15), from a joint bank 
account (Id , page 31, lines 20-25), he relying on the community property provisions of the state 
of California (Id , page 117, lines 14-18) One-half of the house payment was greater than the 
rent he would have been paying elsewhere (Id , page 117, line 19 - page 118, line 2 ) He also 
worked on the home, including placing on a redwood deck (Id , page 118, lines 3-4) In May 
1990, the Appellee and Appellant purchased a 70 acre farm in Delta, Utah (Amended Findings, U 
11) The parties separated in June of 1994 (Id at U 19 ) Trial was held on October 13, 1995 
During the trial, the trial Court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-marital 
I R S obligation of Appellant In the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court found that an I R S obligations of the Appellant incurred prior to their marriage was not 
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commingled with the property of the parties. The amount of the obligation was $ 20,256.72. 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 3-4, % 8.) Thereafter, however, the 
trial court found that the Appellant's I R S . obligations relative to the Appellee were "one-half of 
which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of 
$ 10,128.36." (Id., page 8, U 25.) Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to 
satisfy the defendant's debt with the I.R.S." (Id. at page 10, U 39.) The Amended Decree 
awarded judgment to the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $ 20,256.72. (Amended Decree, page 
3, f^ 11.) The property distribution arising out of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law is properly summarized as follows: 
Appellee Appellant Interveners 
Assets 
Sutherland Home 
Water Payment 
from Defendant 
Payment from 
Interveners 
Deseret Water 
Shares 
Judgment for 
I R S . Gift 
Debts 
7 
$36,250 Farm $ 20,780 
Melville Melville 
$ 9,203 Water $ 27,900 Water $27,900 
Deseret Applt. 
Water $ 10.920 to Pay $ 2.700 
$ 4,500 
$ 728 
$ 20.256 
$70,937 $59,600 $30,600 
•/2l992I.R.S.Debt $ .350 Suther. Hm. Rental 
Loan $25,000 Costs $ 4.500 
Water 
Liability $ 2,700 
Water 
Liability $ 9,203 
Marital 
Debts $ 2,600 
Judg. 
for IRS. 
Gift $ 20,256 
Vi 1992 
IRS. 
Debt $ 350 
$ 350 $60.109 $ 4.500 
NET PROPERTY $ 70.587 (— $ 509) $26.100 
(The valuations of the home, farm, and water are taken from the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, page 6, ^ 19; the intervenor's obligation of $ 4,500.00 to Appellee is found 
in id, page 4, \ 9; intervenor's loans to the parties in the amount of f$ 2,700.00 is found in id., 
page 6, U 17; page 10, % 5; the joint IRS tax liability for 1992 is found in id., page 11, Tf 40; the 
payment to the Appellee for the water stock in the amount of $ 9,203.36 is taken from the Decree 
of Divorce, page 2, paragraph 4). 
The trial court also found that the Appellee received $ 229.00 in a monthly pension benefit 
and $ 799.900 in monthly social security disability benefits, for a total monthly income of 
$ 1,028.50. Defendant had $ 736.67 income imputed to him. (Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, page 2, % 5.) Alimony of $ 175.00 per month was awarded in favor of 
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Appellee (Id ) Paragraph 7 b of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree did not designate when the alimony was to terminate or any 
extenuating circumstances that justified an award of the same beyond the time period of the 
marriage 
VII. Summary of the Arguments 
The trial court's award of alimony clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider 
the binding standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones v Jones l 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly take into account the "ability 
of the husband to provide support "2 The trial court also failed to follow the statutory 
requirements of U C A § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony for an unlimited time The Court 
also abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital debt of the Appellant paid, 
in part, by Appellee, almost eight years before the decree was entered and (2) entering a judgment 
that did not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
VIII. Argument 
A. The Award of Alimony Was Clearly An Abuse of Discretion 
The trial court found that Appellee had monthly income of $ 1, 028.50 and Appellant had 
imputed monthly income of $ 746 67 When the alimony ordered by the Court is taken into 
account, the monthly income of the Plaintiff-wife becomes $ 1,203.50 and that of the Defendant-
husband becomes $ 571 67 If a minimum debt service of $ 300 00 per month secured by the 
Melville water stock (on which Appellant has already received a cash payment for her portion) is 
1 700P2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
2
 Id at 1075 
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made, the imputed income of Appellant is lessened to $ 271.67. The payment of rent by 
Appellant in the amount of $ 150.00 per month (Transcript, page 77, lines 17-22) would leave the 
Appellant with $ 121.67 for all of the personal living expenses as well as other debt service 
imposed by the trial court. Awarding alimony under these circumstance failed to take into account 
the financial situation of the Appellant as required by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones 
v. Jones. The property settlement and debt obligations of parties do not justify a different result. 
When the division of property is completely resolved, the property interests balance as follows: 
Appellee receives $ 70,587.00, Appellant receives a negative $509, and Intervenors receive 
$ 26,100.00. (In the event that Intervenors are granted additional relief, the disparity will 
increase.) For all of the foregoing, it was an abuse of discretion to award alimony under the facts 
of this case. | 
Even if any award of alimony is proper, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) provide 
that "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." 
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree did not designate when the alimony was to terminate or any 
extenuating circumstances. As the Decree does not comply with the statutory requirements, 
Appellant should be relieved of that effect of the judgment until it is corrected in accordance with 
law. 
B. Awarding Appellee the "IRS Judgment" Was An Abuse of Discretion 
During the trial, the trial court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-marital 
I R S . obligation of Defendant Boyd E. Broderick. In the Amended Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, the Court found that this payment was to be divided between the parties 
"one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the plaintiff shall receive, in 
the amount of $ 10,128 36 " (Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 8, f 25 ) 
Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant in 
the amount of $ 20,256 72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt with the 
I R S " (Id at page 10, ^ 39 ) The Amended Decree awarded judgment to the Plaintiff against 
the Defendant for $ 20,256 72 (Amended Decree, page 3, % 11 ) The amount of the judgment is 
in error for at least three reasons 
First, having already found in paragraph 25 of the findings that one-half of the I.R.S debt 
could be retained by the Appellant, or $ 10,128 36, an award of $ 20,256.72 against the 
Appellant as a judgment for the entire I R S payment is in error. "The importance of complete, 
accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law " Smithy Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Indeed, if 
"a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such action 
would be capricious and that such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand " 
Malstrom v Consolidated Theaters. 4 Utah2d 181, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955) 
Second, assigning the Appellant total liability for the I R.S debt is an abuse of discretion 
when no evidence exists to contradict that the payment had been a gift or other non-liability 
situation from one spouse to the other * Had there been any intent to hold the Appellant liable for 
3
 This concept follows the standard used in evaluating gifts and exchanges of inherited or 
other property between spouses who later divorce Osguthorpev Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, 
535 (Utah App 1990), citing Mortensen v Mortensen. 760 P 2d 304, 308(Utah 1988) (Emphasis 
added ) See also Willevv Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App 1993). 
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the LR.S. obligation, it could easily have been included in a pre-marital or post-marital agreement4 
or some other evidence of intent to hold a party liable for a paid debt in the event of a divorce. 
Third, for the significant disparity of property division, and the fact that the Appellant 
I 
contributed all of his salary during the marriage to the family checking account in reliance on the 
marriage relationship,5 it is inequitable under the doctrine of equitable estoppel (as raised in 
Appellant's answer) to now impose liability on him for this newly created, inequitable obligation 
arising from conduct over nine years before. There was no evidence introduced indicating that at 
the time of the payment of the I R S . obligation there was a contemporaneous understanding or 
attempt by the Appellee to hold the Appellant liable for the debt or that there was any intent to 
preserve the payment as an asset of the Appellee. 
Thus, regardless of the theory used, awarding an independent judgment for the entire 
amount of the payment made for Appellant's pre-marital LR.S. obligation does not follow 
"logically from, [nor] is supported by the evidence and controlling legal principles [or equity]." 
Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
IX: Conclusion 
4
 Matter of Estate of Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994). 
5
 Transcript, pages 115-118, pointing out that he had lived there for two years before the 
marriage without making house payments (page 115, lines 11-20), did not participate in making 
house payments until he was married (page 115, lines 18-23), and when working for Hughes or 
Quaker Oats, gave all of his salary to the Plaintiff which she administered as she thought best, 
(page 116, line 7 - page 117, line 15), from a joint bank account (page 31, lines 20-25), he 
relying on the community property provisions of the state of California (page 117, lines 14-18), 
which payment was greater than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere (page 117, line 19 
- page 118, line 2.) Having made such payments, and worked on the home, including placing on a 
redwood deck (page 118, lines 3-4), because of the marital relationship, the Plaintiff may not now 
ignore the marriage relationship to regain a gift she made over nine years ago as part of that 
relationship. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in determining to award alimony to Appellee as well 
as an judgment for a pre-marital I R S obligation of the Appellant In awarding alimony, the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider the binding standards articulated in 
the case of Jones v Jones.6 wherein the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed three factors that must 
be considered when making an award of alimony The trial court clearly abused its discretion 
when it failed to properly take into account the "ability of the husband to provide support "7 The 
trial court also failed to follow the statutory requirements of U C A § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding 
alimony for an unlimited time 
The trial court further abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital 
debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost nine years before the decree was entered 
and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
X: Addendum 
The following documents are included with Appellants' Opening brief as an Addendum 
1 Amended Decree of Divorce dated October 31, 1996, filed November 1, 1996 
2 Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions and Law, dated October 31, 1996, filed 
November 1, 1996 
3 Notice of Appeal dated November 27, 1996, filed November 27, 1996 
4 Transcript of Trial, pages 1, 19, 77, 115-118 
5 Objection to Motion to Proposed Finding, Memorandum and Closing Argument 
6
 700 P 2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
7
 Id at 1075 
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from Appellants' Counsel, pages 1-4. 
6. Objection to Motion to Amend, etc., Interveners, pages 1, 5-6 
DATED this 24,h day of June, 1997. 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
?h^n/^i. /Jc.iJ<-*. k<,i^.M PJ, 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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JU^Or. 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile. (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 22,825 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant. 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK, 
Intervenors. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 944401066 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on October 13, 1995. The plaintiff 
was present and represented by her attorney, Don R. Petersen of Howard, Lewis & Petersen; 
the defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Eldon A. Eliason; and the intervenors 
were present and represented by their attorney, Paul D. Lyman. The Court heard testimony, 
received evidence, reviewed the file, and issued a Memorandum Decision dated January 16, 
1996. The Court notes the motion to amend filed by the plaintiff and the objections filed by the 
intervenors and entered its ruling on August 13, 1996. The Court notes that Rule 8 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all pleadings shall be so construed to do substantial 
justice. The Court having heretofore entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and being fully advised in the premises, makes and enters the following: 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby restored her surname of "Drikas." 
3. Plaintiff and defendant are hereby awarded the personal property now in their 
respective possession, except that defendant is awarded the parrot and porcelain doll now in 
plaintiffs possession. Defendant is also awarded the manuscript signed by President Grover 
Cleveland if and when plaintiff finds it. 
I 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Sutherland home, without any encumbrances, 
and $9,203.36, secured by her one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water stock. If 
defendant fails to remit the $9,203.36 amount to plaintiff within six (6) months from the Court's 
signing the decree, plaintiff is granted the right to foreclose on the water stock. 
5. Plaintiff shall assume none of the marital debts. Defendant's name shall be 
removed from the deed to the Sutherland home. 
2 
6. Defendant is hereby awarded the farm, the 62 shares of Melville Irrigation 
water stock subject to plaintiffs one-fourth interest, and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock. 
7. Defendant is ordered to assume the $25,000.00 debt secured by the water stock, 
the $2,700.00 debt owed to intervenors for their loan to make payments on the Sutherland home, 
the Plus One Plumbing debt in the amount of $900.00, the First Security Visa debt in the 
amount of $1,000.00, and the Zions Bank Visa debt in the amount of $700.00. In addition, 
plaintiffs name shall be removed from the certificates for water stock, upon defendant's 
satisfying the $9,203.36 award to plaintiff; from the deed to the farm; from the Plus One 
Plumbing account; from the First Security Visa account and from the Zions Bank Visa account. 
8. Intervenors shall retain their one-half interest in the 62 shares of Melville 
Irrigation water stock. 
9. All parties, including intervenors, shall pay their own attorney fees. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded alimony in the amount of $175.00 per month retroactive 
to February 28, 1996. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff $175.00 per month on the 
28th day of each month until such time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate or otherwise 
legally not be entitled to the same. 
11. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant in the amount of 
$20,256.72, which is the amount the plaintiff paid towards the defendant's obligation to the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
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12. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the intervenors Alma L. Broderick and 
Sephronia L. Broderick in the amount of $4,500.00 for delinquent rent. 
13. Plaintiff is awarded two shares of Deseret water stock, subject to any loan 
wherein the stock is used as collateral. The loan should be repaid as ordered by the Court and 
two shares of Deseret water stock are to then be released and transferred to the plaintiff. 
DATED this ? / day of September, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
•£& 
iURNINGHAM 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ. 
Attorney for Intervenors 
ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ. and ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Guy R. Burningham for his 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days 
for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this day of September, 1996. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of September, 1996. 
Paul D. Lyman, Esq. 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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COPY 
•' FIL^D 
Matthew Hilton (A3655) 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
197 South Main Street # 1 v, , ^. t4 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone: 801-489-1111 
Facsimile: 801-489-6000 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—oooOooo— 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee. : MAILING CERTIFICATE 
vs. 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. : Civil No. 960775 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIA L BRODERICK, 
Interveners and 
Appellants 
I 
—oooOooo— 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June 1997 I placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, first class, a copy of the document entitled APPELLANT'S 
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL filed in this case, to the following counsel of record: 
Paul D. Lyman, Esq. 
835 East 300 North #100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
1 
Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1997. 
Matthew Hilton, Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Appellant Boyd Broderick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the 24th day of June, 1997, Matthew Hilton appeared before me and swore 
under oath and penalty of perjury that he had signed the foregoing mailing certificate 
and that the statements contained therein were true. 
DATED this 24th day of June 1997. 
Notary Public 
JEANNE M.LEVIE I 
825 West 2000 North 
Mapieton, Utah 84664 | 
My Commission Expires i 
September 30. 2000 I 
State of Utah J 
/ ; 
*L> H. L h. 
TARY PUBLIC 
A : 
- ^ -
2 
Eldon A. Eliason, Esq. 
P. 0 . Box 605 
Delta, UT 84624 
fyl^yUt 
SECRETARY 
J:\DRP\BRODRCK.DEC 
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 22,825 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant. 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK, 
Intervenors. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 94401066DA 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on October 13, 1995. The plaintiff 
was present and represented by her attorney, Don R. Petersen of Howard, Lewis & Petersen; 
the defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Eldon A. Eliason; the intervenors 
were present and represented by their attorney, Paul D. Lyman. The Court heard testimony, 
received evidence, reviewed the file, issued a Memorandum Decision dated January 16, 1996, 
received the plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce, together with accompanying memoranda of the parties; and the Court having issued 
its ruling on said Motion to Amend on August 13, 1996, and being fully advised in the premises, 
it now makes and enters the following: 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are, and have been, residents of Millard County, State 
of Utah, for three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married on October 24, 1987, and are currently 
wife and husband, respectively, 
I 
3. No children were born of this marriage and none are expected. 
4. During the course of the marriage, the parties experienced irreconcilable 
differences making it impossible for them to continue their marriage relationship. 
5. Plaintiff is currently disabled and receives a $229.50 monthly pension benefit 
and a $799.00 monthly social security disability benefit, for a total monthly income of 
$1,028.50. Defendant shall have a monthly income of $736.67 imputed to him. 
6. Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff owned a home in Southgate, 
California, subject to a mortgage. The home owned by the plaintiff in Southgate, California at 
the time of the marriage of the parties had a value of $110,000.00, subject to a mortgage of 
$59,000.00. 
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7. Upon careful consideration of the case law and Utah statute, it appears that 
reversible error has occurred with this Court's present lack of sufficient findings regarding 
alimony. Upon consideration of the four factors outlined in § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the Court makes the following findings: 
a. That the plaintiff is currently disabled and has ongoing needs which this 
Court was unable to provide for in the property division already made. 
b. That the defendant is able-bodied and able to provide alimony to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $175.00 per month, which amount is reasonable to assist the plaintiff 
in her ongoing needs. This alimony should be retroactive to the date of the Decree of Divorce, 
February 28, 1996. Due to the duration of this marriage, the alimony is permanent until such 
time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate or otherwise legally not be entitled to the same. 
8. In December, 1987, the parties refinanced the Southgate, California home to 
borrow an additional sum of $30,000.00. From that amount, the parties paid $20,256.72 to the 
Internal Revenue Service to pay defendant's tax debt, $2,900.00 to remodel the Southgate home, 
and $3,343.28 as a down payment on a home in Delta, Utah. These debts and assets were all 
commingled, with the exception of defendant's tax debt. Defendant's name was put on the home 
in Southgate, California because of the debt he had with the Internal Revenue Service, as set 
forth in paragraph 7 above in the amount of $20,256.72. The home was refinanced to pay off 
the defendant's tax debt. The only reason the defendant's name was put on the home in 
Southgate, California was to pay off a debt that he had incurred prior to marrying the plaintiff. 
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It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be reimbursed for the $20,256.72 which was used 
from the plaintiffs home which she owned prior to her marrying the defendant to pay off the 
defendant's debt which was incurred prior to their marriage. 
9. Intervenors, who are defendant's parents, purchased a home in Delta, Utah in 
1972. Intervenors sold this home to plaintiff and defendant on September 6, 1988 for 
$15,000.00. Plaintiff and defendant paid $6,500.00 as a down payment--$3,343.28 from the 
refinancing of the Southgate home and $3,156.72 from their earnings-and for the remainder 
they obligated themselves for monthly payments in the amount of $300.00. Alma L. Broderick, 
one of the intervenors, entered into a written contract with the plaintiff and defendant to rent the 
plaintiff and defendant's home located in Delta, Utah, for the sum of $250.00 per month. There 
is owed the sum of $9,000.00, which is calculated from February, 1989, to January, 1993. It 
is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be granted judgement against the intervenors Alma L. 
Broderick and Sephronia L. Broderick in the amount of $4,500.00 for delinquent rent. 
10. In January, 1993, plaintiff and defendant deeded the Delta home back to 
intervenors in exchange for $15,000.00: $3,500.00 truck value, $2,000.00 loan in 1992, 
$9,000.00 cash, and $500.00 reduction in price. 
11. In May, 1990, plaintiff and defendant purchased a 70-acre farm near Delta, 
Utah, together with 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water stock and 30 shares of Deseret water 
stock, for $66,389.28. Plaintiff and defendant paid $12,859.28 as a down payment and 
obligated themselves for monthly payments of $775.47. Of the $12,859.28 down payment, 
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plaintiffs parents contributed $5,000.00 as a gift to plaintiff, and intervenors contributed 
$7,859.28 as a loan to plaintiff and defendant. 
12. Plaintiff and defendant are the joint-tenant owners of record on the farm 
property. Plaintiff, defendant and intervenors are the joint-tenant owners of the 62 shares of 
Melville Irrigation water stock. Intervenors' names were placed on the water stock certificate 
to secure repayment of their $7,859.28 loan to plaintiff and defendant and for the bank's added 
security on the farm loan. 
13. Plaintiff and defendant made the monthly payments until September, 1991, 
when intervenors began managing the farm and making the monthly payments. In addition, 
intervenors reaped the benefits of managing the farm and of making the payments. 
14. In March, 1993, the Southgate, California home finally sold for $150,000.00. 
Plaintiff and defendant received a net sum of $52,413.04. Of the net proceeds, plaintiff and 
defendant paid $36,390.04 to retire their farm mortgage obligation; plaintiff and defendant used 
the remaining $16,023.00 for living and farm expenses. 
15. On June 4, 1993, plaintiff and defendant purchased a home in the Sutherland 
area for $27,000.00. Zions Bank loaned them the purchase money, secured by the Melville 
Irrigation and Deseret water stocks. The monthly payments are $300.00. The remaining 
obligation is about $25,000.00. 
16. Plaintiff and defendant made the monthly payments on the Sutherland home 
through June, 1994, except that intervenors made the March, 1994, payment. Plaintiff made 
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the monthly payments from July, 1994, to January, 1995. Intervenors made the monthly 
payments from February, 1995, to October, 1995. 
17. Plaintiffs payments total $2,100.00; intervenors' payments total $3,000.00: 
the February, 1995, to October, 1995 payments amounted to a $2,700.00 loan to plaintiff and 
defendant; the March, 1994 payment amounted to a gift to plaintiff and defendant. 
18. Plaintiff and defendant separated in June, 1994; plaintiff has lived alone in the 
Sutherland home since the separation. 
19. The average appraised value of the farm with water stock is $87,500.00: 70 
acres of land is $20,780.00, 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water stock at $900.00 per share 
is $55,800.00, and 30 shares of Deseret water stock at an average price of $364.00 is 
$10,920.00, for a total water stock value of $66,720.00. The average appraised value of the 
Sutherland home is $36,250.00. 
20. Intervenors' assets relating to this matter include their one-half interest in the 
Melville Irrigation water stock, valued at $27,900.00. The $2,700.00 loan to plaintiff and 
defendant for nine monthly payments of $300.00 each towards the Sutherland home, and the 
$7,859.28 loan to plaintiff and defendant for the down payment on the farm, are not actual debts 
of plaintiff and defendant, in that intervenors have their interest in the Melville Irrigation water 
stock with a value significantly greater than the loan amounts. Therefore, the value of 
intervenors' total interest relating to this matter is $27,900.00, which creates a significant 
windfall to intervenors. 
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21. The value of the Sutherland home plus the value of the farm with water stock 
is $123,750.00. By subtracting out interveners' interest, plaintiff and defendant have interests 
valued together at $95,850.00. 
22. Plaintiffs assets include a one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water 
stock, valued at $13,950.00; a one-half interest in the Deseret water stock, valued at $5,460.00; 
$5,000.00 of equity in the farm, derived from a gift from her parents and used in the down 
payment; a one-half interest in the farm, after subtracting her $5,000.00 down payment, valued 
at $7,890.00; a one-half interest in the Sutherland home, valued at $18,125.00; one-half of a 
debt owed by defendant to the community for the community's payment of his separate tax debt, 
in the amount of $10,128.36; a debt owed by defendant for his share of seven monthly payments 
plaintiff made alone, valued at $1,050.00. Plaintiffs total asset value is $61,603.36. 
23. Plaintiffs debts include one-half of the obligation to Zions Bank for the 
Sutherland home, in the amount of $12,500.00; one-half of the obligation owed to intervenors 
for nine $300.00 mortgage payments relating to the Sutherland home, in the amount of 
$1,350.00; one-half of the First Security Visa debt, in the amount of $500.00; one-half of the 
Zions Bank Visa debt, in the amount of $350.00; one-half of the Plus One Plumbing debt, in 
the amount of $450.00. Plaintiffs share of the marital obligations is $15,150.00. 
24. Defendant's assets include a one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water 
stock, valued at $13,950.00; a one-half interest in the Deseret water stock, valued at $5,460.00; 
a one-half interest in the farm, after subtracting plaintiffs $5,000.00 down payment, valued at 
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$7,890.00; a one-half interest in the Sutherland home, valued at $18,125.00. Defendant's total 
asset value is $45,425.00. 
25. Defendant's debts include one-half of the obligation to Zions Bank for the 
Sutherland home, in the amount of $12,500.00; one-half of the obligation owed to intervenors 
for nine $300.00 mortgage payments relating to the Sutherland home, in the amount of 
$1,350.00; one-half of the First Security Visa debt, in the amount of $500.00; one-half of the 
Zions Bank Visa debt, in the amount of $350.00; one-half of the Plus One Plumbing debt, in 
the amount of $450.00; one-half of the seven $300.00 payments plaintiff paid on the Sutherland 
home, in the amount of $1,050.00; a debt owed by defendant to the marital estate for its 
$20,256.72 payment of his separate tax debt, one-half of which amount defendant may retain 
and one-half of which plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $10,128.36. Defendant's share 
of the marital obligations is $26,328.36. 
26. Intervenors' assets relating to this matter have a net value of $27,900.00. 
Plaintiff has a net value, i.e., after subtracting debt value from asset value, of $45,453.36. 
Defendant has a net value of $19,096.64. 
27. The parties own two shares of Deseret water stock which came with the 
purchase of the Sutherland home, which stock should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject, 
however, to the pledge of the shares as collateral on the loan. The loan should still be repaid 
as already ordered, and when the two shares are released, they should be transferred to the 
plaintiff. 
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28. Plaintiff and defendant are indebted to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes 
incurred for the year 1992 in the approximate amount of $700.00. This was an obligation 
incurred while the parties were living together. The plaintiff was unemployed; the defendant 
was employed and working. It is reasonable and proper that both the plaintiff and defendant 
equally share this obligation. 
From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
29. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce divorcing her from defendant on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
30. Plaintiff may restore her surname to "Drikas." 
31. Plaintiff and defendant shall be awarded personal property now in their 
respective possession, except that defendant shall be awarded the parrot and porcelain doll now 
in plaintiffs possession. Defendant shall also be awarded the manuscript signed by President 
Grover Cleveland if and when plaintiff finds it. 
32. Plaintiff shall be awarded the Sutherland home, without any encumbrances, and 
$9,203.36, secured by her one-fourth interest in the Melville Irrigation water stock. If defendant 
fails to remit the $9,203.36 amount to plaintiff within six (6) months from the Court's signing 
the decree, plaintiff shall have the right to foreclose on the water stock. 
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33. Plaintiff shall assume none of the marital debts. Defendant's name shall be 
removed from the deed to the Sutherland home. 
34. Defendant shall be awarded the farm, the 62 shares of Melville Irrigation water 
stock subject to plaintiffs one-fourth interest, and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock. 
35. Defendant shall assume the $25,000.00 debt secured by the water stock, the 
$2,700.00 debt owed to intervenors for their loan to make payments on the Sutherland home, 
the Plus One Plumbing debt in the amount of $900.00, the First Security Visa debt in the 
amount of $1,000.00, and the Zions Bank Visa debt in the amount of $700.00. In addition, 
plaintiffs name shall be removed from the certificates for water stock, upon defendant's 
satisfying the $9,203.36 award to plaintiff; from the deed to the farm; from the Plus One 
Plumbing account; from the First Security Visa account and from the Zions Bank Visa account. 
36. Intervenors shall retain their one-half interest in the 62 shares of Melville 
Irrigation water stock. 
37. All parties, including intervenors, shall pay their own attorney fees. 
38. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony and the defendant should pay to her 
the sum of $175.00 per month from February 28, 1996. This sum should be paid on the 28th 
day of each month, until such time as the plaintiff may remarry, co-habitate, or otherwise legally 
not be entitled to the same. 
39. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount of 
$20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt with the IRS. 
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40. Both the plaintiff and the defendant should equally share the obligation owed 
to the IRS for the tax year 1992. 
DATED this %/ day of September, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PAULD. LYMAN, ESQ. 
Attorney for Interveners 
ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
R. 'BURMNGHAM 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG* 
11 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PAUL D. LYMAN, ESQ. and ELDON A. ELIASON, ESQ.: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham for his 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days 
for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this <> day of September, 1996. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of September, 1996. 
Paul D. Lyman, Esq. 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Eldon A. Eliason, Esq. 
P. O. Box 605 
Delta, UT 84624 
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Matthew Hilton (A3655) 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
197 South Main Street # 1 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
MILLARD COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee. 
vs. 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK, 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 94W366-DA 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
Intervenors and 
Appellants 
—oooOooo— 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant and Apellant, Boyd E. Broderick, 
through his counsel, Matthew Hilton of MATTHEW HILTON, P.C., hereby appeals the final 
judgment entitled Amended Decree of Divorce entered November 1, 1996, by the Honorable 
Judge Guy R. Burningham of the Fourth District Court, Millard County, to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment with the exception of the granting of the 
1 
divorce 
DATED this 27,h day of November, 1996 
MATTHEW HILTON, P C 
illlffei^/JL., 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
BoydE Broderick 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, MILLARD COUNTY 
Vi \ 
ELAINE BRODERICK, 
V S . 
BOYD BRODERICK, 
is?" V ^ rv 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 94401066 
Defendant. 
Preliminary Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
October 13, 1995 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNIN6HAM 
Fourth District.Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
(Elaine Broderick) 
For the Defendant: 
(Boyd Broderick) 
For the Interveners: 
(A. L. Broderick) 
DON PETERSEN 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)373-6345 
ELDEN ELIASON 
PAUL D. LYMAN 
835 East 300 North 
Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801)896-2675 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P. 0. BOX 1786 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
TELEPHONE: (8 01)2 2 4-9847 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
that I h 
Q. 
health? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
marriage 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
central. 
Q. 
Does your mother and father help you financially? 
Yes, sir. 
What do they do for you? 
I eat there so that I can, you know, make sure 
ave food. 
In regards to your husband's health, how is his 
As far as I know, fine. 
Now, you were married in '87? 
Yes, sir. 
Where did you live? 
We lived in the house that I had previous to the 
• 
Where was that? 
10235 Walnut, Southgate, California. 
Tell the Court where Southgate is. 
It's in the central area of Los Angeles. South 
Were you buying the home at the time you married 
the defendant? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Now, what day were you married? 
October 24th, '87. 
Did you have occasion to refinance the home? 
Yes, we did. 
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BOYD BRODERICK. 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PETERSEN: 
Q. Would you state your name, please. 
A. Boyd Abel Broderick. 
Q. And you're the defendant in this action; are you 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Broderick, where do you reside? 
A. In Hinkley. 
Q. What is the address? 
A. 500 West 900 North. 
Q. Who owns the property where you reside? 
A. My folks. 
Q. Are you paying any rent? 
A. A hundred and a half. 
Q. Do you pay that every month? 
A. Only when I can. 
Q. Have you been paying that regularly? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you recently inherited any property? 
A. Recently? 
Q. Well, have you inherited any property? 
77 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let's get this straight. Now, you got married in 
'87, didn't you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And it wasn't seven years that you lived there. 
You moved to Utah, I think we determined, in 1992; did you 
not? So you lived there five years. 
A. (Inaudible)• 
Q. You have to answer audibly. 
A. Five years. 
Q. Well, your testimony was you lived there for 
seven years, but you didn't live in that home for seven 
years, did you? 
A. I lived with her just about not quite two years 
before we got married. 
Q. Oh, I see. So you say you moved in in '85? 
A. Not totally, but yeah, I was there. 
Q. Well, you weren't living there and making house 
payments in 1985. 
A. No, I wasn't making house payments. 
Q. You didn't start participating in the house 
payments until you got married, did you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. You got married in 1987. Now, you didn't 
live in that house for seven years after you got married, 
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did you? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. You did not live in that house for seven years 
after you got married, 
A. It would be five years. 
Q. So it's five and not seven? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when were you terminated by Hughes? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. About 1990, wasn't it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Now, you lived there for a period of time before 
you moved to Utah; did you not, after you were terminated 
by Hughes? 
A. In the house? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after you were terminated by Hughes you made 
no further -- you didn't make any money, so you didn't 
make --
A. Yes, I did make money. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I worked for Quaker Oats. 
Q. When did you terminate with them? 
A. The latter part of '92, I guess. What month, I 
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don't know. 
Q. So are you saying you lived there and made house 
payments from '87 to '92? 
A. (Inaudible). 
Q. That's a yes? 
A. No, I'm guessing. 
Q. Your guessing? 
A. For positive, I can't tell you. 
Q. Now, you're saying that you paid half the house 
payment and Mrs. Broderick paid the other half; is that 
correct? 
A. No, what I'm saying is we put everything in the 
kitty, and she made the checks, she paid the bills. 
Q. Okay, but my notes indicate under direct 
examination you said you paid half the house payment. 
A. Well, I just put everything half. What's hers is 
half. What's — it's half and half, right? Community 
property. 
Q. Now, you'd have had to pay rent or something. If 
you weren't living there you would have paid somewhere 
else; would you not? 
A. That's true. 
Q. You would have paid more than what you were 
paying to live in that house; would you not? 
A. Not necessarily, no. 
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Q. You could have got by for less? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any evidence that you put $10,000 for 
improvements? 
A. I put a 20-by-24 redwood deck outside. 
Q. I'm talking money. 
A. Do I have receipts? 
Q. Yeah. Do you have cancelled checks? 
A. She's got the receipts. She could produce all 
the receipts. 
Q. So the $10,000 is just a guess; is it not? 
A. No, it's pretty close. Real pretty close, 
accurate. 
Q. But you don't have a cancelled check or a receipt 
or anything like that with you? 
A. No, not on the (inaudible) because I don't have 
the records. She has all the records. When I left I just 
took my personal belongings and that was it. 
Q. You walked out on her; did you not? She was sick 
and that's when you walked out. 
A. Yes, I left. Yes. 
Q. You did the same thing in Utah; did you not? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When you dumped cookie dough on her head? 
A. No, I didn't. 
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ELDON A ELIASON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Box 605 Delta, Utah 84624 
(801) 864:2515 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE BRODERICK : DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
Plaintiff,
 # PROPOSED FINDING/ MEMORANDUM 
AND CLOSING ARGUEMENT 
vs • 
BOYD BRODERICK 
Defendant 
A.L. BRODERICK : 
and 
MRS. A. L. BRODERICK : 
Intervenors : 
1 Defendant, through his legal counsel, registers his 
Objection in reply to the proposed Findings and Conclusions 
and represents that the same are not supported by the facts and 
evidence submitted at the trial. 
2 At the time Plaintiff Counsel submitted his amended 
findings and objection to the first set of findings adopted from 
the Court's ruling, defendant's counsel was in St. Mark's Hospital 
for which he was confined for over two months with surgerical pro-
cedures. Defendant's Counsel had reviewed Plaintiff's fiTst~ findings 
and accepted them as copied from the Court's ruling. 
3 It is represented to the Court that Plaintiff's findings now 
are not supported by the evidence which was presented at the trial 
and made part of the ruling. Plaintiff, following her first marria-ge 
^
 o7o< 
was married to defendant a shorter time without apparent change 
in her circumstances. 
4 She was domineering and aggressive. He was passive and 
submissive as evidenced by both direct testimony and cross ex-
amination. He brought his paychecks home and delivered them 
to her. She wrote the checks on the account. If they lived 
lavishly, she did it. She obtained credit cards at various 
places including banks. He never signed for a credit card or check 
during the marriage. He never used a credit card during the 
marriage. She lived beyond their means. He did not. Her 
aggressiveness was displayed in Court when she attempted to 
shut down her mother's testimony and was cautioned by the 
Court. 
5 Defendant is about 50 .yrsi of age. He does not have skills 
that will enable him to obtain an adequate living. On a short 
second marriage with his limitations there is no justification 
for alimony, and to impose it would tend to make him a victim 
of charity or becomes subject to law enforcement for inability 
to pay alimony. 
6 A second husband has some obligation to his divorced 
wife even if they, Boyd and Elaine, had no children and he did 
not dissipate the estate. The law places certain responsibil-
ity on family and parents, including the previous husband of 
Elaine's. Boyd was married to Elaine for only five years. 
7 Defendant knows farming and can be a self-employed 
farmer. His parents have spent a considerable amount of money 
in helping to acquire a farming program. 
8 Alimony is usually based on the following factors: 
9 Utah Supreme Court has long held that once a court has 
determined that something is marital property, notwithstanding 
name on title, the Court may distribute it equitably. (Hoag-
land vs. Hoagland (852 P2 1025) 
The Court is empowered to make such distribution as is 
just and equitable . (Jones vs. Jones (700 P21072) 
2 
The Court may consider, 
(a) Age of parties 
(b) Ability, training and education 
(c) Present income 
(d) Effect on welfare of supporting spouse and 
receiving spouse 
(e) Ability of supporting spouse to provide 
supporting obligations imposed by the Court 
10 The Court is required to base its ruling on the circum-
stances of each particular case, and Plaintiff testifed as 
follows when asked about Boyd Broderickfs employment in Utah: 
"He received $4.50 per hour at the cheese plant." 
"No one else will hire him." 
11 Defendant came to Utah with prospects of a job to sub-
sidize his farming. IFA (Intermountain Farmers) instead re-
quired him to take a competency examination and gave the job 
to another. Defendant sought employment from Brush Wellman, 
Intermountain Power, Continental Lime, The Cement Plant, 
McDonalds, to list a few-- all to no avail. He tried to take 
guard duty at Intermountain Power or cleanup work at McDonalds.' 
This was known to his wife; and to represent to the Court or 
infer to the Court he would not work, is grossly unfair. 
12 It is also misleading to state or infer that defendant 
had no interest in the California home, when, infact, defendant 
turned every one of his paychecks from five to seven years to 
Elaine and she paid all the bills and kept all the receipts. 
She paid the payments on the home with at least one-half of his 
money. She ran up credit card obligations of $30,000; and 
passed it off by testifying Boyd had no credit card transactions 
because of his credit problem with Internal Revenue Service. 
13 If we follow the proposed findings, the defendant will 
be paying twice for his wife's spendings, and then be paying 
3 
alimony besides on an income less than his modest living expense. 
He lives in a rented trailer on property not his own, industrious-
ly farming property which his parents have substantially provided 
14 Defendant concurs in objections and proposed amended 
findings by Counsel for Intervenors. 
^ 
c 
Respectfully, 
^r^gW 
Eldon A. Eliason 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant. 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIAL. BRODERICK, 
Intervenors 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
and 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION 
Civil No. 94401066DA 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
OBJECTION 
COME NOW the Intervenors and Object to the Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
The motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(e) and must be based upon one or 
more of the grounds stated in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No grounds are set forth. 
As is more fully explained in the accompanying Memorandum, the 
Plaintiff is simply trying to reargue the entire case. Her motion 
should be denied. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This matter came on for trial on October-13, 1995. The 
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Plaintiff, the Defendant and the Intervenors were all present and 
represented by counsel. After a full day of testimony and numerous 
exhibits were received, the Court took this matter under advisement. On 
January 16, 1996, the Court issued an extensive Memorandum Decision 
going point by point through the evidence and making the necessary 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A set of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were prepared by the 
Plaintiff's attorney, signed by the Court and entered by the clerk. 
The Plaintiff has now filed a Motion to Amend. 
CONTROLLING RULE 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
pertinent part the following: 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a 
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a 
new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
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(2) Misconduct of the jury; and 
whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general 
or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, • 
by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct 
may be proved by the affidavit of any one 
of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, 
material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the veridct or other decision, or 
that' it is against law. 
(7) Error in Law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the 
application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4) , it shall be 
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to 
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
Rule 59 provides a clear cut process for a party to seek 
relief short of an appeal in trials without a jury. It requires the 
moving party to base its motion on one or more of the grounds stated in 
Subdivision (a). Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 
309, 311 (Utah 1979). 
The first four itemized grounds must be supported by an 
accompanying affidavit. Rule 59(c) . No affidavit was filed and so the 
grounds must be one or more of the last three alternatives. Rule 
59(a) (5) requires a claim that the court's ruling was "given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice." No such allegation exists. Rules 
59(a) (6)and (7) require a claim that the evidence was insufficient or 
that there is an error in law. No such allegations exist. 
The Plaintiff has simply filed a written version of his final 
argument, which argument the trial court did not fully accept, so the 
Plaintiff is trying again. This second try should be rejected. 
In the Plaintiff' s Motion, she asks for 13 specific 
amendments. As the following analysis demonstrates, the court was aware 
of each argument and no amendment needs to be made: 
A. Motion paragraphs 1, 2, and 10, all deal with the handling of 
the Defendant's $20,256.72 IRS debt. The court was fully 
aware of that debt and how the parties handled that debt. 
(Memorandum Decision, paragraph 8) . The Plaintiff and 
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Defendant were married and the Plaintiff agreed to use her 
residence as collateral for the refinancing loan to pay this 
debt. When the home was sold the proceeds were taken and 
applied to joint assets and obligations of the parties. 
(Memorandum Decision paragraph 14.) Those assets and 
obligations were fully divided by the court after hearing the 
Plaintiff's argument at trial. 
B. Motion paragraphs 3 and 11, deal with the Plaintiff's rent 
claim. Although the hotly disputed "written contract" was 
fully litigated at trial, it is not specif ically mentioned in 
the Memorandum Decision. The subject matter of the claimed 
rent was fully and completely handled by the court. 
(Memorandum Decision paragraphs 9 and 10.) The Plaintiff 
raised this argument at trial and it was not persuasive. 
C. Motion paragraphs 4, 5, and 12 deal with encumbrances on the 
Sutherland house and Deseret water stock. Those issues were 
fully handled by the court. (Memorandum Decision paragraph 
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34). The 
Plaintiff did not seek this relief at trial and now wants to 
rewrite this portion of the ruling without any basis. 
D. Motion paragraphs 6 and 13 attempt-to get the Defendant to 
assume specif ically a debt that was not brought up at trial. 
The Memorandum Decision made the Defendant responsible for all 
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marital debts. (Memorandum Decision paragraph 31.) 
It is not appropriate to try to add this specific 
debt at this time to the Defendant's obligations. 
E. Motion paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 14 attempt to retry the alimony 
and attorney's fee issues. These were major claims of the 
Plaintiff at trial. After the court made its property 
divisions, the issues of alimony and attorney's fees were 
summarily decided. (Memorandum Decision paragraphs 35 and 
36.) Neither party was employed, although both had held jobs 
during the marriage, and both parties had been awarded 
substantial assets in the divorce. The court's actions were 
within its discretion and no basis for reopening these issues 
has been presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 59 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. No basis for amending the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce has been presented. The 
Plaintiff's motion should be denied. 
DATED this l day of March,, 1996. 
j UJ.^L P PAUL D. LYMAN 
Attorney for Intervenors 
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Mr. Don R. Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 778 
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Mr. Eldon A. Eliason 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 605 
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Matthew Hilton (A3655) 
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Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone: 801-489-1111 
Facsimile: 801-489-6000 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—oooOooo— 
ELAINE D. BRODERICK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee. : MAILING CERTIFICATE 
vs. 
BOYD E. BRODERICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. : Civil No. 960775 
ALMA L. BRODERICK and 
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK, 
Intervenors and 
Appellants 
—oooOooo— 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June 1997 I placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, first class, a copy of the document entitled APPELLANT'S 
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